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Abstract The research reported in this paper is part of our attempt to get to a 
deeper understanding of why with and without are special prepositions in taking 
singular bare nouns more easily than other prepositions. The paper focuses on the 
semantics of existential and incorporation have, which we take to be the same and 
to constitute the verbal counterpart of with and without. We propose 
existential/incorporation have builds relations: it selects one-place predicates and 
turns them into two-place predicates.  
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1 Introduction 
Recent corpus work on bare nouns in PPs in Romance and Germanic has shown 
that some prepositions are more likely to be followed by bare nouns than others. 
One preposition pair in particular stands out, viz. with and without (Le Bruyn, de 
Swart & Zwarts 2009; Kiss & Roch to appear):
1
 
(1)  without result    
(2)  met  resultaat   DUTCH 
  with result 
(3)  uten      sal   NORWEGIAN 
  without saddle 
(4)  con  baño    SPANISH 
  with bathtub 
                                                 
*
 This research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), grant 
360-70-340. For very useful comments and discussions, we would like to thank the members of 
the Weak Referentiality Project as well as audiences at the following conferences: Weak 
Referentiality and Definitude (Florianópolis, 2012), The syntax and semantics of pseudo-
incorporation (Potsdam, 2013) and SALT 23.  
1
 In this paper we are abstracting away from the fact that within the with/without pair, without 
takes bare nouns even more productively than with. See Kiss & Roch (to appear). 
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(5)  sans      témoin  FRENCH 
  without witness 
(6)  mit   Garten   GERMAN 
  with garden 
The research reported in this paper is part of our attempt to get to a deeper 
understanding of why these prepositions are special. We start our exploration in 
the literature on incorporation have (section 2), establish a link with existential 
have (section 3) and propose a new unified analysis of the two (section 4). Section 
5 concludes and gets us back to with and without. 
2 With, without and incorporation have 
Under the assumption that the appearance of with and without with bare nouns is 
not an isolated phenomenon, it is instructive to look at semantically similar cases 
outside the preposition domain. Le Bruyn et al. (2009) as well as Castroviejo, 
Oltra-Massuet & Pérez-Jiménez (2012) suggest a link with incorporation have 
(Borthen 2003; Dobrovie-Sorin, Bleam & Espinal 2006; Espinal & McNally 
2009, 2011; Lazaridou-Chatzigoga & Alexandropoulou 2013): 
(7)    Han hadde rød ytterfrakk. NORWEGIAN 
    he    had     red coat 
    ‘He had a red coat.’ 
(8)    Ion are casă.     ROMANIAN 
    Ion has house 
    ‘John has a house.’ 
(9)    María tiene casa.    SPANISH 
    María has  house 
   ‘María has a house.’ 
(10)   Eho   amaksi.     GREEK 
    Have car 
   ‘I have a car.’ 
The examples in (7) to (10) show how a number of languages that in principle 
require their singular arguments to appear with determiners make an exception for 
have. Even though the counterparts of have in languages like English, Dutch and 
French in general don’t take bare nouns, the pattern emerging in (7) to (10) is 
difficult to ignore and raises the following question: what is special about have 
that makes it compatible with bare nouns? 
 Before we look into the literature on incorporation have, we need to make 
explicit two simplifications we are building into this paper. The first is that we are 
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restricting our attention to have and its cross-linguistic counterparts even though 
other semantically related verbs like to wear, to buy, etc. behave the same way to 
some extent. The motivation for this comes from the intuition that the have-
relation is the semantic core of these verbs, which – in the literature – have been 
dubbed have verbs (Borthen 2003). The second simplification is that we will not 
focus on a number of semantic/pragmatic effects that are sometimes attributed to 
incorporation have: the reduced discourse transparency of its object or the limits 
on the nouns it can combine with. Our intuition is that the cross-linguistic picture 
that emerges in (7-10) can only be accounted for if there is a stable semantic 
reason for incorporation have to behave the way it does. We consequently want to 
avoid zooming in on semantic/pragmatic effects that – at least in part – vary 
cross-linguistically.  
With the above simplications in mind, we can take a closer look at the 
literature on incorporation have. The most advanced analysis we are aware of is 
the one proposed by Espinal & McNally (2011) for Catalan and Spanish. They 
propose a lexical rule by which verbs denoting situations that depend on the 
existence of a have-relation can be shifted from verbs taking e-type objects to 
verbs taking <e,t>-type objects. By restricting the application of this lexical rule 
to verbs involving a have-relation, Espinal & McNally nicely capture the class of 
verbs that allow for bare singular arguments in Catalan and Spanish.  
Despite its empirical coverage as well as its theoretical contribution to the 
literature on incorporation, the analysis Espinal & McNally propose leaves an 
important question unanswered. Indeed, their analysis presupposes that have is 
special, but it doesn’t explain what it is that sets have apart from other verbs. In 
this paper we want to take the analysis of have one step further before returning to 
the preposition domain. This is what we will do in sections 3 and 4. 
3 From existential have to incorporation have 
The basic question we will be answering in the present and the next section is 
why have is more likely than other verbs to take bare singular objects. As we have 
seen in section 2, this question hasn’t been raised in the literature on incorporation 
have but there’s an ironic inverse of this question in the literature on existential 
have (Landman & Partee 1987; Partee 1999; Landman 2004; Sæbø 2009): 
(11) Mary has a sister. 
(12) *Mary has the sister. 
The intuition about (11) is that it is not about Mary ‘having’ a sister but rather 
about a sister relation holding between someone and Mary. Accounting for this 
intuition has been at the heart of the literature on what is known as existential 
have, a name inspired by its apparent restriction to indefinite objects (compare 
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(11-12)). The basic strategy all analyses pursue is to turn Mary into the first 
argument of the relational object noun. The challenge then is to circumvent both 
the indefinite article and have.  
In this section we zoom in on Landman’s analysis, in which circumventing the 
indefinite article effectively boils down to rendering its presence superfluous. 
Even though we will ultimately reject his analysis, it does provide a very good 
starting point for our own.  
Landman’s analysis is embedded in his adjectival analysis of indefinites 
according to which indefinite DPs are generated as predicates. In this analysis of 
indefinites, the indefinite article makes no semantic contribution.  
For reasons of space, we will give a simplified version of Landman’s have: 
(13) [[have]] = Rvz(R(v)(z)) 
  Where R is of type <e,<e,t>> 
What (13) does is select a relation, keep its first argument available for the subject 
to bind, and existentially close its second argument.  
 The derivation of (11) is worked out in (14): 
(14) [[sister]]  =      xy(sister of (x)(y)) 
  [[a sister]]  =     xy(sister of (x)(y)) 
  [[have a sister]] =    Rvz(R(v)(z))  (xy(sister of (x)(y))) 
         vz(xy(sister of (x)(y))(v)(z)) 
         vz(sister of (v)(z)) 
  [[Mary have a sister]]  = z(sister of (Mary)(z)) 
With the assumptions about a and have in place, the derivation is straightforward. 
The end result is as desired: the sentence is true as soon as there is an individual 
who stands in the sister-relation to Mary.  
 Abstracting away from the details, the main insight Landman has is that have 
is a unique verb in that it mediates between relations at the nominal and at the 
sentence level. The role of the indefinite article is consequently void: have selects 
relational objects and turns them into the main predicate of the sentence, a process 
in which the indefinite article has no semantic role to play.  
 Now that we have established how the indefinite article can be superfluous for 
existential have, we can ask the question whether we can extend the analysis in 
(13) to incorporation have. The short answer is yes. Indeed, there is no formal 
reason that would prevent us from doing so. The only assumption we have to 
make is that the object nouns in (7-10) have all been reinterpreted as relational. 
This assumption comes at a very low cost given that the transitivisation operation 
underlying this reinterpretation has been independently motivated in the literature 
on possession (see Barker 2011): 
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(15) [[transitivise]] = Pxy(P(y)&R(x)(y))  
where R is a free pragmatically controlled variable standing for a relation 
What (15) does is select a one-place predicate and turn it into a two-place 
predicate. We follow Sæbø (2009) in assuming that the pragmatic specification of 
R typically involves basic relations like the own- or the part of-relation. A 
predicate like house could then come out as in (16) where we have interpreted R 
as the own-relation. 
(16) xy(house(y)&owned by(x)(y)) 
When combined with Landman’s version of existential have, this leads to the 
following semantics for (9): 
(17) [[María tiene casa]] = z(house(z)&owned by(Mary)(z)) 
As desired, María tiene casa will turn out to be true in case there is a house that 
Mary owns.  
The conclusion we arrive at is that existential have and incorporation have can 
both be analysed as in (13). The special characteristic of have that makes it 
compatible with bare nouns is consequently that it mediates between relations at 
the object and at the sentence level.  
4 Have some more 
In section 3, we said that there was no formal reason that would prevent us from 
analysing incorporation have along the same lines as existential have in 
Landman’s analysis. Doing so would, however, make an important prediction, viz. 
that relational nouns and nouns with a clear relational interpretation are the 
preferred type of noun for incorporation have to combine with. A quick study of 
the singular bare nouns combining with the Spanish counterpart of have in the 
Corpus del Español however reveals that this prediction is not borne out, neither 
in synchrony nor in diachrony. The proposal to extend Landman’s analysis of 
existential have to incorporation have consequently loses an important part of its 
appeal.  
In this section, we propose a new analysis of incorporation have that builds on 
Landman’s analysis of existential have (4.1.). We furthermore show that it can be 
extended to existential have (4.2) and how it can even solve a potential problem 
for Landman’s analysis (4.3). At the end of this section, we will be in a position to 
give our final answer to the question why have is more likely to take bare singular 
objects than other verbs (4.4.). In section 5 we will then translate this insight to 
the preposition domain. 
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4.1 From a relation mediator to a relation builder 
The gist of our proposal is that instead of being a relation mediator, have actually 
builds relations: where Landman makes have select two-place predicates, we 
propose it selects one-place predicates and transitivises them: 
(18) [[have]]  = Pzn(transitivise(P)(z)(n)) 
To show the effect of (18), we work out the derivation of (9). From now on we 
will add letters to the different steps of the derivations in order to be able to 
comment on some of the details.  
(19) [[María tiene casa]]  = 
  [[casa]]  =       
a. y(casa(y)) 
  [[tiene casa]] =     
b. Pzn(transitivise(P)(z)(n))  (x(casa(x))) 
  c. zn(transitivise(y(casa(y)))(z)(n)) 
  d. zn(xy(casa(y)&R(x)(y))(z)(n)) 
  e. zn(xy(casa(y)&owned by(x)(y))(z)(n)) 
  f. zn(casa(n)&owned by(z)(n)) 
  [[María tiene casa]]  =   
g. n(casa(n)&owned by(María)(n)) 
Tiene selects the <e,t> predicate casa and applies transitivisation to it (see 19d). 
As before, we pragmatically specify the relation R that comes with this 
transitivisation as the own-relation (see 19e). Tiene is furthermore parallel to 
Landman’s have in that it existentially closes the second argument of the 
transitivised predicate while keeping its first argument available for binding by 
the subject. The end result is truth-conditionally equivalent to the one we obtained 
through Landman’s analysis. However, by making sure incorporation have does 
not select relational predicates, we no longer make the prediction that relational 
nouns or nouns with a clear relational interpretation are its preferred type of 
object. 
 We are now in a position to give a first sketch of an answer to our leading 
question, viz. why it is that have is more likely to combine with singular bare 
objects than other verbs. The answer is that have – and in particular incorporation 
have – is special in that it comes with a built-in transitivisation operation that 
takes one-place predicates as its input. Transitivisation consists in adding a two-
place predicate R that takes the argument of the input predicate as its second 
argument.  
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We indicated before that we assume the default specification of R will involve 
basic relations like the own- or the part of-relation. In sections 4.2. and 4.3. we 
will see that this default can be overruled as soon as there are contextually salient 
relations. This will prove crucial in extending our analysis of incorporation have 
to existential have.  
4.2 From incorporation have to existential have 
In this section we show how our analysis of incorporation have can be extended to 
existential have.  
If incorporation and existential have are indeed the same verb, this means they 
should also select the same type of arguments. Given our assumption that 
incorporation have selects <e,t> predicates, we consequently expect existential 
have to do the same. What this amounts to is that the relational nouns that are 
typically taken to combine with existential have cannot maintain their relational 
nature in the process. As a consequence, we expect relational nouns like sister – at 
least at some point in the derivation – to have the following detransitivised 
semantics: 
(20) xy(sister of(y)(x)) 
What we have done in (20) is to existentially close the first argument of sister, 
thus ending up with the set of individuals who are sisters of someone. For this 
paper, we remain neutral as to whether we should take (20) to be the lexical entry 
of sister or whether we should take it to be the result of a type-coercion operation. 
It should be clear, though, that the relation-building nature of have makes most 
sense if it turns out to be a necessary ingredient to transitivise nouns. 
 In order to show that our analysis of incorporation have derives the correct 
semantics for (11), we work out and discuss its derivation: 
(21) Mary has a sister 
[[a sister]] =  
a. Pxy(sister of(y)(x)&P(x)) 
[[have a sister]] =  
b. Pzn(transitivise(P)(z)(n))  (Pxy(sister of(y)(x)&P(x)))          
[type-clash] 
c. Pzn(transitivise(P)(z)(n))  (xy(sister of(y)(x)))                
   [BE] 
d. zn(transitivise(xy(sister of(y)(x)))(z)(n)) 
e. zn(vxy(sister of(y)(x)&R(v)(x))(z)(n)) 
f. zn(y(sister of(y)(n)&R(z)(n)))        
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[transitivisation and -conversions] 
g. zn(y(sister of(y)(n)&sister of(z)(n)))     
[pragmatic specification of R] 
[[Mary have a sister]] =  
h. n(y(sister of(y)(n)&sister of(Mary)(n))) 
The crucial observation is that this derivation ends up with the right analysis. It 
derives that Mary has a sister is true as soon as someone stands in the sister-
relation to Mary. There are, however, two peculiarities that deserve closer 
attention. The first is to be found in (21b) and (21c) where we see that the type of 
a sister clashes with the type requirement of have: have needs an <e,t> argument 
where a sister is of type <<e,t>,t>. This type-clash is resolved by a standard BE 
type-shift that undoes the contribution of the indefinite article. The second 
peculiarity is to be found in g. where we pragmatically specify R as the 
contextually salient sister-relation. This raises two questions. The first is whether 
our analysis is not too weak:  if we had not specified R as the sister-relation, we 
would have ended up with an interpretation according to which Mary need not 
have a sister. Interestingly though, this is as desired. Indeed, even though Mary 
has a sister typically means that there is a sister-relation between someone and 
Mary, the sentence is also felicitous in a context in which Mary belongs to a 
group of individuals who have to take care of other people’s sisters. R would then 
be specified as having to take care of. This suggests that our analysis is not 
weaker than Landman’s and that by relegating the specification of R to 
pragmatics we improve on its empirical coverage. The second question our 
specification of R raises is concerned with the apparent redundancy we are 
creating. As becomes clear in (21g), our analysis specifies twice that n stands in 
the sister-relation to someone. We get back to this in section 4.4. where we will 
argue that – rather than being an unwarranted redundancy – this double 
specification constitutes another improvement on Landman’s analysis.  
Given that the derivation in (21) leads to the desired interpretation, we take it 
to be established that our analysis of incorporation have can be extended to 
existential have. Before we formulate our final answer to the question why have – 
and in particular incorporation/existential have – is more likely than other verbs to 
take singular bare objects, we briefly show how our analysis avoids a potential 
problem Landman’s analysis faces. This is the topic of section 4.4. 
4.4 A problem for Landman 
In this section we work out a problem Landman’s analysis of existential have 
seems to face and show how it disappears if we assume our analysis. We leave it 
to the reader to check that other classic analyses like Partee 1999 and Sæbø 2009 
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face the same problem as Landman (see also Le Bruyn, de Swart & Zwarts, 
submitted). 
The problem pops up in the analysis of sentences like (22):  
(22) Mary has the only lazy sister. 
If we were to follow the standard theoretical intuition according to which Mary 
functions as the first argument of sister, the sentence would read as Mary has a 
single lazy sister. This interpretation does not correspond to the one we typically 
get for (22), viz. that Mary is the only person who has a lazy sister. The crucial 
difference between the two is that the former would allow other people than Mary 
to have lazy sisters whereas the latter does not allow for this possibility. In what 
follows we develop our argument by working out two derivations: one following 
Landman’s analysis of have and one following our own.  
We start by fixing the semantics we assume for the and only. Given that the 
two analyses of have we will be working with come with different type 
requirements, we present type variants for each of them, starting with the. 
The fact that the definite article appears to be allowed with existential have 
seems to come as a surprise given the unacceptability of (12). The thought that 
some uses of the actually do co-occur with existential have has consequently 
never really entered the discussion. Most authors, including Landman, have 
accordingly tried to come up with ways to exclude the definite article from 
combining with existential have. Interestingly though, Partee’s and Sæbø’s use of 
the predicate exist only blocks the presuppositional version of the definite article 
from appearing with existential have whereas its non-presuppositional version is 
expected to be fine. It’s this version that we will adopt. In (23) we present the 
standard generalized quantifier analysis of non-presuppositional the, in (24) its 
adjectival counterpart, and in (25) its adjectival relational counterpart: 
(23) [[the]] =   PQx(P(x)&z(P(z)x=z)&Q(x)) 
(24) [[theadj]] =   Px(P(x)&z(P(z)x=z)) 
(25) [[theadj/rel]] = Rxy(R(x)(y)&z(R(x)(z)y=z)) 
We will use (24) as a shorthand in combination with our version of have. This is 
identical to assuming (23) with an application of BE after combining the 
determiner with its complement. For Landman’s have we will use (25). This is 
necessary to implement his intuition that have mediates between relations at the 
object and at the sentence level. 
DP-internal only has received fairly little attention in the literature. The two 
accounts we are aware of are the ones by McNally (2008) and Coppock & Beaver 
(2012). Both accounts – glossing over some details – give the lexical entry in 
(26), which we will adopt in its basic version for our analysis of have and in its 
relational version in (27) for Landman’s analysis: 
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(26) [[only]] =  Px(P(x)&z(P(z)z=x))  
(27) [[onlyrel]] =  Ryx(R(y)(x)&z(R(y)(z)x=z)) 
Given that the semantic effects of only are included in the, we will take the 
semantics of the in (24) and (25) to be our shorthand for the semantics of the only. 
With the above lexical entries in place, we can work out both Landman’s and 
our analysis of (22). We start by spelling out Landman’s: 
(28)    [[Mary has the only lazy sister]] = 
a. [[sister]] =  
xy(sister of(x)(y)) 
b. [[lazy sister]] =  
xy(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y))    
c. [[the only lazy sister]] =  
xy(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y)&z((sister of(x)(z)&lazy(z))y=z)) 
e. [[have the only lazy sister]] =  
  xy(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y)&z((sister of(x)(z)&lazy(z))y=z)) 
  f. [[Mary have the only lazy sister]] =  
  y(sister of(Mary)(y)&lazy(y)&z((sister of(Mary)(z)&lazy(z))y=z)) 
The problem in this derivation is most obvious in the truth conditions it ends up 
with: rather than stating that Mary is the only person who has a lazy sister, it 
states that Mary has a single lazy sister. The reason we end up with this 
interpretation is to be found in the fact that the universal quantifier does not 
quantify over individuals who are lazy sisters but over individuals who are lazy 
sisters of Mary. This means the problem is to be found in the fact that we specify 
Mary as the first argument of sister.
2
 
 In (29) we work out our proposal in which we start from our analysis of 
incorporation have and a detransitivised version of sister. 
(29)    [[Mary has the only lazy sister]] = 
a. [[sister]]  =  
yx(sister of(x)(y)) 
b. [[lazy sister]]  =  
yx(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y))   
c. [[the only lazy sister]] =  
                                                 
2
 In Le Bruyn, de Swart & Zwarts (submitted), we explain why we think playing around with the 
scope of only would not save Landman’s analysis. We do however agree that a scope trick might 
work for sentences with superlative objects that – at first sight – seem to constitute a similar 
problem for Landman. 
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y(x(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y)&z(v(sister of(v)(z)&lazy(z))y=z)) 
  d. [[have the only lazy sister]] = 
  uy(x(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y)&z(v(sister of(v)(z)&lazy(z))y=z) 
&sister of(u)(y)) 
  e. [[Mary have the only lazy sister]] = 
  y(x(sister of(x)(y)&lazy(y)&z(v(sister of(v)(z)&lazy(z))y=z) 
&sister of(Mary)(y)) 
Despite the fact that the formulas became slightly more complex because of the 
uniqueness requirement of the only, the derivation in (29) is parallel to that in 
(21). In particular, it states twice that y is a sister of Mary. We can now explain 
why this double specification is crucial. The first specification (not italicized in 
29e) makes sure that y is the only lazy sister in the model while the second 
specification (in italics in 29e) relates y to Mary. The analysis we end up with 
thus states that there is a single lazy sister and that it is Mary’s. This is as desired.  
If we had conflated the two sister specifications we would have ended up with 
the same problem as Landman’s analysis, viz. that the sentence would have been 
about the only lazy sister of Mary rather than about the only lazy sister of anyone. 
The double specification thus turns out to be a crucial improvement rather than an 
unwarranted redundancy. 
On the basis of the preceding, we conclude that extending our analysis from 
incorporation have to existential have and thus giving a unified analysis of the 
two is not only theoretically attractive but might also have empirical advantages.  
4.4 The special nature of have 
We have now come to the point where we can give our final answer to the 
question why it is that have is more likely to combine with bare singular objects 
than other verbs. The answer lies in the fact that – at least on its 
incorporation/existential interpretation – have is unique in being a relation- 
building expression: it selects one-place predicates and turns them into two-place 
predicates. Adding an indefinite article would consequently be a mere 
complication of the derivation.  
 One question that could be raised is why we analyse have as a verb containing 
a transitivisation operator that selects expressions of type <e,t> rather than 
expressions of type e. If an analysis of the latter type were feasible, we would lose 
our insight into why have easily combines with bare singular objects. One 
indication that suggests that have selects expressions of type <e,t> rather than of 
type e is to be found in another theoretical intuition of Landman’s (2004). Unlike 
Partee (1999) and Sæbø (2009), Landman builds existential quantification over 
the second argument of the relational noun into the verb. We follow him in this 
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strategy by building existential quantification over the second argument of the 
transitivised predicate into the verb and consequently predict it to always take 
narrow scope.
3
 This seems to be in accordance with our intuitions: 
(30) John doesn’t have a sister. 
The most straightforward interpretation of (30) is that John does not have any 
sister. A similar observation has been made for incorporation have (Espinal & 
McNally 2011): 
(31) Juan no tiene casa. 
  John not has house 
  ‘John doesn’t have a(ny) house.’ 
(31) can only be interpreted as stating that John doesn’t have any house. If we had 
analysed incorporation/existential have as a verb taking e-type objects, we would 
have expected its objects to be able to outscope the negation in (30) and (31). If 
our intuitions are on the right track, we consequently have ground to assume that 
have selects <e,t>-type rather than e-type objects.  
A complicating factor for checking our intuitions is the potential polysemy of 
have that might make it hard to restrict scopal research of its objects to 
incorporation/existential have. We take this to be a challenge for future research. 
5 Summary and conclusion 
The research reported in this paper was part of our attempt to get to a deeper 
understanding of why with and without are special prepositions in taking singular 
bare nouns more easily than other prepositions. We mainly focused on the verbal 
domain, proposing and defending a new – unified – analysis for incorporation and 
existential have. The basic intuition underlying the analysis is that have builds 
relations: it selects one-place predicates and turns them into two-place predicates. 
Returning now to with and without, our proposal is that they constitute – at least 
on one of their readings – the counterparts of have in the preposition domain. In 
the same way as have triggers relationality for its objects, with and without trigger 
it for their complements. In (32), we work this out for without result: 
(32)  a. [[without]]  = Pzn(transitivise(P)(z)(n)) 
   b. [[without result]]  = zn(result(n)&Present with(z)(n))   
(32) presents without as the negated preposition counterpart of have: it selects a 
one-place predicate, turns it into a two-place predicate while keeping the first 
                                                 
3
 This is a classic way to force narrow scope. See e.g., Carlson 1977 and Van Geenhoven 1998.  
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argument of the transitivised predicate available for binding and existentially 
closing its second argument. 
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